- Context
- Churchill addressed the House of Commons in Committee in London on February 26, 1935, moving to report progress on the Government of India Bill after the Indian Princes' Bombay resolution rejected the federal scheme, and urged abandoning federation.
- Main themes
- Rejection of the federal scheme by the Indian Princes, motion to report progress, accession of the Princes to the Federation, Government of India Bill federal clauses, Clauses 5 and 6, safeguards and suspension of the Constitution, Governor-General's special responsibilities, railways and finance disputes, Secretary of State's 1 January broadcast, 1931 Round Table Conference bargain, Statutory Commission proposals, Walpole and the Excise Bill
- Duration
- ~28 min
- Words
- 3,412
- Sentences
- 136
- Readability
- 53
- Grade
- 11.9
- Syntax
- 3.06
- Vocabulary
- 2.18
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other136 sentences in 51 paragraphs
I beg to move, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."
The Committee will not, I am sure, be surprised at my venturing to submit this Motion. I do so because of the momentous news which has been received from India, and which we learn from every side in the public Press. I do so for the purpose of commenting upon that news and pointing out the position in which we stand with regard to the Clauses which have now become the immediate subject of debate; and also for the purpose of giving the Secretary of State the opportunity, which no doubt he will desire, of making a statement on the subject. According to the reports which have appeared, and which I do not understand to be in any way challenged as official reports, the Princes of India, at their meeting in Bombay yesterday, passed a resolution which no doubt is present to the minds of hon. Members of this Committee, and the closing paragraphs of which indicate very definite rejection of the Government's scheme for the Federation of India. What strikes me about this resolution, the summarised reports, and the telegrams which, it is said, the Princes have addressed to the Secretary of State, is the variety, the gravity, and the substance of the differences which exist. These are not differences which can be described in any way as matters of drafting, as small points which can be adjusted, minor matters which make for some misunderstanding which can easily be cleared up later on on Report. It is said that these differences touch the following matters:
The form and mode of accession to the Federation.
The provisions for the preservation of treaties and agreements concluded with the States.
The special responsibilities of the Governor-General in respect of the States.
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Then there is a most important point, touching the efficacy of the safeguards in the event of grave public disorder supervening in India and its being necessary to suspend the Constitution.
Measures to be taken in the event of its being necessary to suspend the Constitution.
The treatment of privileges and immunities.
Enforcement of the Federal laws and the powers vested in the Governor-General to give directions to the rulers of States.
The extent of the executive authority of the Federation in regard to the States.
There are further differences which have arisen on finance, and also upon what I should have thought was a very essential matter to federation, namely, the working of the statutory railway board in relation to the competition between State railways in the possession of native States and State railways in the possession of the Government of India. I venture to submit that this resolution constitutes a new political situation so far as the future of this Bill is concerned. Certainly I cannot conceive how, in the face of all these Amendments and alterations which are put forward by a body whose concurrence is indispensable to the entire process of the Bill, we can be asked to discuss the remaining general question of Clause 5, and still less Clause 6, which deals with this very topic of accession.
I have pointed out already the inconvenience to which the Committee would be put in embarking upon these discussions before we knew what the Princes' decision was, and, indeed, it seemed quite likely that we should have already disposed of Clause 6 by this time. Happily, it is still in the possession of the Committee, but how is it competent for us to discuss it? Here are Amendments which affect the whole basis, and we do not know what the Amendments are, nor, I suppose, is the right hon. Gentleman in a position to tell us exactly what the Amendments are or to place them on the Paper. If we were able to put them on the Paper in two or three days, we could easily postpone the Clauses until the Amendments were there, but to discuss the Clauses without knowing what are all the alterations in
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the structure of the Bill, to discuss the whole question of federation in all the Clauses in the Bill without knowing whether in fact the indispensable condition, namely, the accession of the Princes is going to be achieved, is purely to confront the House with the prospect of discussing a hypothetical matter with the prospect of embarking on a great waste of time, thus condemning us in all probability to a prolonged and dreary farce. This question of the accession of the Princes is, as everyone recognises on both sides, the Government and the Opposition, and those of us who dissent from the proposal of the Government, the foundation of the whole policy. I am not going to burden the House with any more quotations than one which is necessary to establish the ease. The Secretary of State in his broadcast speech on 1st January said:
There cannot be provincial autonomy without federation, and federation must be all-India federation embracing the States and British India. If there is to be federation, there must be responsibility in the central Government if only to satisfy the reuirements of the Princes, who will not enter a federation controlled by Whitehall.
There is the foundation, and it has been the whole story that the Government have told from the beginning of the discussion. It was for this that they made their departure from the more or less solid ground of the Statutory Commission. It was at this point that the landslide at the first Round Table Conference occurred. This was the point where they threw the train of coaches off the line with the disaster that we have suffered from ever since. I could give a dozen instances of the Secretary of State's insistence on this point. On this everything stands. This is the rigmarole that he taught all his followers to proclaim with so much insistence.
I see the Lord President in his place and I am bound to address myself to him amicably but pointedly. The Lord President met his party at Queen's Hall at a meeting to which great importance was attached and around which a great deal of interest hung. What was the crux of his appeal? It was that you must not reject this offer of the Princes. My right hon. Friend would not have thrown all that weight on to that topic at this moment if he had not honestly believed that there was a prospect of a great new situation, and to seize that
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prospect, to enjoy that opportunity, was what he urged them to do. He quoted first of all the Foreign Secretary's recantation of the Simon Report. He quoted the Foreign Secretary as saying:
But since we reported there has been a new fact.
There has been another new fact.
We were commissioners, but we were not prophets, and it was not until after we had reported that the new fact emerged.
He went on to describe the action of some of the Indian Princes which led to' the changes in the Government policy in 1931. The Lord President said to his followers—I can see them visibly wilt under the impact of the appeal—
It would, indeed, be a great responsibility to reject the prospect of a closer union between the Indian Princes and their great territories on the one hand, and the British India, for which we have a special responsibility, on the other.
This is the linch pin of the whole story, and the linch pin has been pulled out. I contend and submit substantially that that is the fact.
I must revert for a moment to the resolution of the Princes. It is not only what they say; it is the tone in which they say it that the House should note. If these were minor difficulties to which a happy outcome was expected, you would not expect a manifesto of this kind containing some very serious things considering the body from which they emanate, considering the relations of those Princes to the Viceroy and to His Majesty's Government.
This meeting desires to emphasise that in many respects the Bill and the instrument of accession depart from the agreement arrived at during the meetings of the representatives of the States with Members of His Majesty's Government.
Only the other day Lord Halifax was saying:
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State is confident that the report pf the Committee does, in fact, substantially meet the reasonable apprehensions of the Princes as they were explained to the Joint Select Committee.
Here the Princes have declared that in many respects these proposals depart from the agreement arrived at. There is a direct conflict of testimony between the two parties. It is always very serious when people who are supposed to be in the closest relations say that there is a breach of an agreement arrived at. You may be sure that there is a great deal of
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feeling behind the differences. The resolution continues:
And regrets to note that the Bill and the instrument of accession do not secure those vital interests and fundamental requisites of the States on which they have throughout laid great emphasis.
Surely this matter cannot be dismissed as a mere question of drafting. It is without a knowledge of the Amendments that will be required to meet these vital interests and fundamental requisites that the Committee is going to be urged to proceed with the discussion of Clause 6 and the other federal Clauses. It went on to say:
This meeting is of the definite opinion that in their present form, and without statutory modification of and alteration to the fundamental points, the Bill and the instrument of accession cannot be regarded as acceptable to the Indian States.
Who are these Princes who made this proposal and committed themselves to -this very far-reaching and weighty pronouncement? They were unanimous in the first instance and they are representative of the Princes of India in an overwhelming degree. The little States were there as well as the great, though not by any means all the little States. The States to whom the greatest inducements have been offered to join the Federation, Mysore, Hyderabad and Travencore—all these States concurred in this resolution, and they are the greatest States in India. They are meant to be the main part of the 50 per cent.—the old guard—upon which the right hon. Gentleman is hoping to rely to carry his proposals. He cut it down to 50 per cent., and here are those great States which were an essential part of the 50 per cent. In addition to that, it is not only the Princes who were lukewarm, who had secret misgivings, who have been talking pretty freely of their misgivings and fears about the Bill and some of them declaring their definite hostility, who are represented in this resolution, but the Princes who were most in favour of this policy, the very Princes who made the original offer, the unauthorised offer as we contend and as many of the other Princes have contended, the very Princes who came forward and have always been paraded as the special champions of this policy and deflected the course of events at the Round Table Conference—these are the Princes who are associated with others in
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this resolution they have presented to us in this form.
The Committee, I think, will see the difficult position in which it is this afternoon in embarking upon the discussion. I must confess that I am not at all surprised at this change of opinion of the active minority of the Princes on whom the Government have hitherto rested as the champions of the Government policy. In fact, I think that this change in their opinion—a very decisive change it is—bears out what some of us have ventured to submit to the House and to the Committee. These were the Princes, these were the minority, who were led to make the so-called offer in 1931 as the result of a bargain with some of the representatives of the Congress, and some of the advanced parties in India. The terms of this bargain—an unholy bargain—were that if the Princes demanded responsible government at the Centre, then the Congress party would leave them to govern their estates as they liked. That was the outline of it.
I want the Committee to see exactly how this matter has worked. These were the Princes most susceptible to the influence of the Indian political classes in British India, and in those days the opinion of those political classes was in favour of a federal system, with responsible government at the Centre. But now that the whole matter has been examined and discussed, those very political classes are in full retreat and in recoil from the proposal. They have carried a resolution against it by an overwhelming majority in the Indian Assembly, and they are undoubtedly bringing their influence to bear upon the Princes with whom they were originally in touch in exactly the contrary sense of four years ago, with the result that those Princes, who are working more or less in close association with those political elements, are moving in the opposite direction just as strongly as they moved in the direction of the Government in 1931.
That is the explanation, and one can see it working. Thus those Princes who were most amenable beforehand to the Government project, are now falling back into the main line of all the rest of the Princes who never liked it, and were only embarrassed by the many influences brought to bear upon them to draw them
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into the main body. Hence the unanimity of all these Princes. The names of the States have only to be read out to dispose of any argument that they are not the dominating force with the Indian Princes, and that is the reason of the unanimity among them. There is another thing not less remarkable which should not be overlooked, and that is that the Ministers are in agreement with the Princes. The Ministers of the States are represented as being in agreement with the Princes. That is very remarkable, because one always can see that the Ministers naturally would be very much in favour of Federation. The Princes, with a dynasty going hack 1,000 years, might very well be cautious, but the Ministers had everything to gain with regard to their personal position, because once they became the nominees of those States in the Federal Assembly their position would be vastly different, their status would be vastly raised and they would no longer hold their position purely at the pleasure of the Princes they served. The idea that when some great Minister of State was playing a great part in the Federal Assembly he could be recalled owing to the fact that the Sovereign under whom he was serving wished to have another nominee, even if it were entertained would be very difficult to carry out in practice. Any assembly worthy of its salt would rally to such a man who was suddenly recalled by an outside power. The Ministers who were to gain this great accretion to their strength have associated themselves with the Princes in these far-reaching declarations.
Thus all the articulate elements in Indian political life from Congress up to the Princes are arrayed against this Bill, and the reason why I move to report Progress is in order to ascertain what course His Majesty's Government wish to pursue. No doubt the Secretary of State will try to minimise the difficulties. He will promise vaguely further important concessions, while at the same time hurrying on these vital Clauses, getting them through the Committee stage without disclosing the details of the concessions at all to the House or the Princes. If the Committee lends itself to this imposture, and if the Government, by using their enormous majority, enforce it upon the House, all I say is that they will only put off and
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only aggravate the inevitable day of reckoning. It is quite certain that the attitude of the Princes is now definitely against this kind of federation at this particular time. The safeguards may be whittled down. You may relax some of the precautions in the veto of the Viceroy which you believe indispensable to the discharge of the responsibilities of this House. The power of the Viceroy to deal with an emergency may be crippled by the concessions which you will propose. The coherence of federal India may be impaired by further awkward concessions in regard to railways and finance, and the small benefits which were offered to us as a result of this enormous change in the structural organisation of the Indian polity will be lost.
Although this may be the method which the right hon. Gentleman is about to adopt, and which has been enforced upon the House, and may condemn us to discussion utterly meaningless, which is an affront to Parliament, yet we predict with confidence that nothing will change now the resolve of the Indian Princes to disengage themselves from what they have realised is a dangerous project, and, while so many things are in flux, nothing will lead them, and nothing should lead them, to quit the, solid rock of their treaties with the King Emperor. Now that we have reached this point, we see the improvidence and the short-sightedness of the kind of arguments used by the Secretary of State, and by my right hon. Friend the Member for West Birmingham (Sir A. Chamberlain), my right hon. Friend the Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery) and by the Noble Lord the Member for Hastings (Lord E. Percy). These are the arguments of which I warned them when I addressed the House before. I am in the recollection of the House that they were very shortsighted in declaring that nothing in this Bill is worth anything without the federal Clauses, and unless the Princes come in, and that without federation they would rather not go on with it, and that we had better drop it altogether rather than proceed with this provincial home rule, without this super-home rule at the summit. That seemed to me to be a most improvident argument at the time when it was uncertain whether the Princes would come in or not. The right hon. Gentleman kept on assuring us that it
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would be all right. Of course they would come in. Of course there would be minor difficulties, and so on. So have all the Government spokesmen said everywhere, but our opinion has, I think, proved more accurate upon this matter—more accurate, at any rate, than any opinion the right hon. Gentleman has yet given to the House or the Committee.
As I say, it seems to me that my right hon. Friends have placed themselves in a position of great difficulty, and so has the Secretary of State, because now, if the Princes do not come in, they have used arguments which will be used against them, or might be used against them, to vitiate even that provincial extension of home rule which was proposed to us by the solemn, carefully worked-out report of our Statutory Commission four years ago. However, we shall leave the Government and its Ministerial supporters to disentangle themselves from these foolish and unforeseeing arguments which were so freely used thus to get round the momentary corner of a Debate. It is clear that the federal scheme is dead. Every day its decomposition will be more evident, and, as the summer advances, more offensive. But even now His Majesty's Government have a chance—perhaps the most blessed end fortunate chance—to get back to the broad proposals of that Statutory Commission to which nothing useful has been added in the last four years. Although we consider, as I have often said, and I am bound to repeat now, that those proposals are a most hazardous experiment, they do not contain the mortal perils of this federal plan. Let the Government discard the federal plan. Let the right hon. Gentleman put aside pride and obstinacy. Let him imitate the prudence and the wisdom of Sir Robert Walpole on the great Excise Bill when, having seen what the situation was, he told his followers and supporters with the greatest conviction, "This dance can no further go."
