Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel at the 49th Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum on January 23, 2019, in Davos:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

23 January 2019 · 49th Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum · Davos, Switzerland

Context
Merkel addressed the World Economic Forum's 49th Annual Meeting in Davos on January 23, 2019, speaking on global architecture amid the fourth industrial revolution.
Main themes
Multilateral order and global architecture, fourth industrial revolution, climate change and global risks, international financial stability, poverty reduction and development goals, World Trade Organization and trade policy, United Nations and international institutions, G7 and G20 cooperation, migration and refugee compacts, reform of international organizations, role of emerging economies, cyberattacks and security challenges
Duration
~33 min
85th percentile
Words
3,962
85th percentile
Sentences
185
87th percentile
Readability
47
53rd percentile
Grade
12.0
45th percentile
Syntax
3.01
48th percentile
Vocabulary
2.01
11th percentile

World Economic Forum · Davos Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 33%33%
  • Economic 22%22%
  • Institutional 15%15%
  • Technological 9%9%
  • Ceremonial 8%8%
  • Social 7%7%
  • Environmental 6%6%
  • Not in focus 0%

185 sentences in 45 paragraphs

Dear Professor Schwab,

ladies and gentlemen,

I am pleased to be back in Davos today. I also have the impression that the snow this year is rather more beautiful than worse. I am happy to welcome you all – especially the colleagues from my cabinet whom I see here – and I would like to tell you that Germany has a stable government again and that we are willing to work well after some initial difficulties.

You have set a topic here in Davos that is of the utmost interest, namely the question: What does the global architecture look like in the age of the fourth industrial revolution?

The starting point of your discussions is characterized by two things; namely, on the one hand by the global risk report, which is always available before such a Davos Forum, indicating that there are a multitude of major challenges. I will only mention climate change and natural disasters, but also cyberattacks and the associated challenges as well as terrorist attacks. At the same time, there are a multitude of disruptions and uncertainties in the multilateral system. This leads, in addition to the general challenges, to declining growth forecasts by the International Monetary Fund. This creates a situation in which one can, I believe, say that this forum can contribute to bringing more security into things, rather than allowing uncertainty to grow even more after such a discussion. Because I believe there are many who are willing to strengthen the multilateral order.

When we look at the global architecture at the beginning of the 21st century, we see that it is still fundamentally shaped by the outcomes of actions taken after the end of the Second World War. We have the United Nations and we have formats – G7 and G20 at the level of heads of state and government – that were developed later in response to one of the major crises, which was ultimately also shaped by digital change, namely the great banking crisis more than ten years ago. To be honest, we must say that this crisis still lingers in our bones today. It has cost an incredible amount of trust – in politics, but also in the economy, especially in the financial sector. The regulations we have introduced – better control of banks – were indeed progress, but if you ask in our countries, you must find that the belief in a stable international financial sector has suffered greatly. Therefore, everything must be done to prevent a recurrence of the crisis. When we look at the interest rate policies of the major central banks, we know that we are still nibbling at this crisis, that we are still not out of it, and that we have also taken space for possible upcoming tasks through this crisis. This means we must regain normality as quickly as possible.

Secondly

, we have large international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization, and we also have a development that shows: This international architecture – the United Nations with all its sub-organizations, the International Labour Organization, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and also the OECD – has contributed to the overall positive development of the world. Despite all the problems, I would like to point out again: When the World Economic Forum was founded in 1971, the world had 3.8 billion inhabitants; 60 percent of them lived in extreme poverty. Today we have 7.6 billion inhabitants in the world; and only ten percent of people still live in extreme poverty. That is 700 to 800 million people, yes, but it is, firstly, fewer in absolute numbers and, secondly, also in percentage terms.

One of the bright spots of international resolutions is, for example, that we have the SDGs, the development goals for 2030, and the world community has committed itself in great unity, for example, to overcome extreme poverty by the year 2030. I believe we can achieve that. Also with the migration pact and the refugee pact, which were comparatively unanimously adopted by the United Nations, we have bright spots. But even with these two things, it has become clear that the international order is currently under pressure and is being questioned.

When we ask what the causes are and look at the history of humanity, we see: The fundamental decisions for our current order date back about 74 years. That is, so to speak, a human age. We must be careful that the knowledge and insights of the people who acted immediately after the horrors of the Second World War are not simply brushed aside carelessly or inattentively by us today. Because back then, I believe, the right conclusions were drawn, for example, by founding the United Nations.

However, we have also experienced that international organizations are ultimately very slow to reform. I think, for example, of how many years it took us to implement the quota reform at the International Monetary Fund or the capital increase at the World Bank. Ultimately, these changes were urgently needed because emerging countries like China and India have long influenced our world economy much more strongly. When an existing system reacts far too slowly to this, it results in others also making themselves known with new institutions. That has indeed happened. If, alongside the established G20 format and the World Bank, there is now, for example, an Asian Investment Bank, if there is a Shanghai Cooperation Organization alongside the G20 format, in which China, India, Russia, and other countries are involved, and if China seeks a 16+1 format to cooperate with parts of the European Union, then that is, I believe, a warning shot and should warn us – I take myself as an example, as I come from the Western world – that we must counteract a fragmentation of the international architecture by being willing to reform the existing institutions so that they reflect the real power relations in the world.

We also know how much the question of how to proceed now is currently dividing the world. I believe we should not beat around the bush. When it comes to reforming existing institutions that set global frameworks, we must be involved and we must accept the existing power relations. However, another approach has emerged; and that is an approach that harbors fundamental doubts about multilateralism and says: The world is best off when everyone thinks of themselves and when everyone first looks at how their own interests stand; and then an order will emerge in which everyone is well off. I have doubts about that. I believe we should understand our national interests in such a way that we take the interests of others into account in order to create win-win situations that are the prerequisite for multilateral action.

In this regard, I see myself as following a sociologist I greatly admire, namely Max Weber, who spoke exactly 100 years ago about the ethics of responsibility for politicians – "Politics as a Vocation" – and set us guidelines, saying: Compromise is a result of responsible action by politicians. When I hear how often it is said today that compromise is something unacceptable, something bad, something negative, I want to state here explicitly: A global architecture will only work if we are overall capable of compromise.

Now we are already having difficulties reforming and advancing the current architecture of global institutions. But the question of this World Economic Forum goes further: Now we have a disruptive development, we have a fourth industrial revolution – what does that mean for the existing architectures? I, for one, stand before you as someone who values multilateralism and considers multilateral institutions indispensable for a prosperous development of the world. Therefore, the question is: Where can we really set new stakes now?

In this regard, I could make a somewhat caricatured but still very serious remark: Some things are still succeeding. On November 16 – I don’t know if you noticed – a revolution took place in Versailles, France. The General Conference on Weights and Measures took place there. With this conference, the old kilogram, the ampere, and other units will be phased out in that they will be redefined by natural constants. This is truly a revolution in the world of weights and measures. The international community has jointly committed to this. From May 20, 2019, we will have redefined all fundamental units. Then the original kilogram from 1889 will no longer shrink, but we will always have a properly defined kilogram. This should encourage us to continue to pursue a reformative approach and to embrace the ideas of modernity.

The

first

major challenge to mention here is the handling of data, their evaluation, and the clarification of ownership issues; this concerns us in all areas.

Secondly:

In the big data world, we have a huge development boost in the field of artificial intelligence. Here, it will also be about establishing ethical guidelines.

Thirdly

, I would like to mention the possibilities of genetic engineering and bioethical questions. There are still far from global agreements on these pressing issues. There must be answers to these pressing questions. I do not yet see a global architecture in place to deal with these issues. However, I cannot imagine that each major economic power will answer them differently.

Let us take a look at the two major poles of data processing. On the one hand, we have the USA. There, data is very much in private hands, which is why we would have to strive to establish guidelines that define where the boundaries lie. My position is that we cannot simply exclude the rules we had in the analog world for the digital world, but that we also need clear guidelines here. On the other hand, we have China. There, there is a very large state access to all data – including personal data. In this respect, these are two approaches that do not correspond to the vision I adhere to and which Germany, with its social market economy, has shaped, in which we must indeed protect personal rights. The European Union has – with all its imperfections – established guidelines with the adoption of a General Data Protection Regulation to better regulate the handling of individual data. This is laborious; but when the industrial revolution took place and people moved from the countryside to the city, it was probably also laborious to constantly carry different sets of keys to get through one’s own front doors. These are civilizational processes that we must go through. I believe, therefore, that we should indeed have the ambition to protect our personal rights to a certain extent.

We also face the major question of tax justice in the digital world. I strongly rely on the proposals currently being developed in the OECD and believe that with the approach of a minimum taxation in combination with what the G20 finance ministers have worked out – the so-called BEPS system – we will achieve more tax justice and more tax clarity. However, we must not leave this to chance.

On the German side, we have been striving since 2014 or 2013, when we had difficulties with the American intelligence service NSA, to repeatedly introduce resolutions in the General Assembly of the United Nations and also in the UN Human Rights Council to address the privacy of data in the digital age. This is a good North-South cooperation, as one would say, because Germany and Brazil are trying, together with Mexico, Austria, and many others, to define more clearly how we can move forward, although I do not want to hide the fact that this is a laborious process.

I am very pleased that my Japanese colleague Shinzō Abe said today that he wants to make Japan's G20 presidency a presidency in which we deal with data and which finds a starting point in data governance. I believe the G20 is a very good format to bring this topic to the agenda across the board and among the largest industrial countries.

If we want to participate on the European side or on the German side in answering the question of what a global architecture should look like, then the prerequisite, of course, is that we are an important actor, that we are an economically strong actor that can also enforce ethical measures. Because that is one of the truths: One will only leave international footprints if one can also keep up economically and is able to not only analyze problems and give others moral guidance but to speak from one's own experience.

If I stay with my own country, Germany, I must tell you that we still have a strong economy, which, however, is very much shaped by the industrial age. We are a country that still has a very high industrial value creation. And we are certainly a country where the automotive industry plays a very large role in value creation. When we look at the revolutionary developments in the automotive industry, we know, of course, that risks lurk here as well: risks related to jobs; risks related to data management. For example, the question of who owns the data is of crucial importance. If the data always belongs to the platforms, then our chances are worse than if they belong to the car manufacturers themselves. The fact that we, for example in Germany, but also in Europe, are still not able to produce battery cells ourselves is certainly a significant shortcoming for the future of the automotive location Europe. Therefore, I still advocate that we make industrial policy decisions here, just as we have already done in chip manufacturing, and use European unity to catch up in technological areas where we have fallen behind. Because I believe we cannot simply leave large parts of value creation in the future car, for example in electromobility, to other continents if we want to remain competitive in the long term.

Germany essentially has four challenges that are very significant for our future, and I would like to mention them here.

First, there is the question of the energy transition – the question of affordable, but also sustainable and climate-friendly energy supply. I am deeply convinced – and it becomes clearer year by year – that climate change has a huge significance for us, or rather for the entire world. This also leads to the responsibility of industrialized countries – not because we could completely change the total emissions with the CO2 we emit in Germany with 80 million people, but because we have the ability and, given the CO2 we have already emitted during industrialization, we also have the responsibility to develop technologies from which others can benefit. Therefore, I am very pleased to tell you – even though this has an impact on our energy prices – that renewable energies in Germany are now the pillar of our energy supply, taking the leading percentage in total energy supply.

We will exit nuclear energy by 2022. We have the very difficult problem that the almost only base-load capable energy sources will then be hard coal and lignite. Germany has now exited its own hard coal production. This has eliminated subsidies. Lignite is not subsidized and is therefore a relatively cheap but very CO2-intensive energy source. Therefore, we have established a commission that deals with Germany's exit from coal and is now in the final phase of its work. But of course, we will not manage without base-load capable energy. Therefore, natural gas will play an increasing role for several decades. That is why the dispute over where we source our natural gas is somewhat exaggerated. Because on the one hand, we will continue to source natural gas from Russia – that is completely clear – but we also want to diversify. Therefore, we will also source liquefied gas; and perhaps also from the United States and other sources. We are thus expanding the infrastructure in all directions. However, I believe we are right to say: If we exit coal and if we exit nuclear energy, then we must also honestly tell people that we will need more natural gas. And energy must also be affordable.

Here we come to a point where we in the coalition have set ourselves the goal of improving. Because I must honestly say: We are realizing our construction projects far too slowly on a global scale. We are too slow in expanding our power lines – the generation of renewable energies requires a completely different line structure. We are too slow regarding our entire infrastructure. – I see our infrastructure minister here. – Our goal must be to become faster, without neglecting the rule of law procedures, of course.

The second point is digitalization. This also involves infrastructure, but much more. I am particularly concerned about the fact – and we can only solve this on a European scale – that we have fallen far behind in the platform economy. Perhaps it is also the case that countries with a fairly saturated and somewhat functioning administration do not feel as much of an urge for innovation as developing countries and emerging economies. What the state does with its citizens is by no means as digitized as it should be. Therefore, we have set ourselves the goal of making all state administrative functions available digitally to citizens by 2022 at the latest. But in this regard, we are really not "front runners" in European comparison, but rather lagging behind a bit.

Digital transformation is working quite well with our large companies, I believe. It is improving with medium-sized enterprises; business-to-business is actually going quite well. But business-to-customer is our open flank. Here we are in a race – that is completely clear – that will determine whether those who operate the platform or those who offer the product will receive the value creation. In my opinion, this battle has not yet been fought – at least not from a German perspective. We can win here, but we must be quick.

The third point is the demographic change in Germany. Here, the freedom of movement within the European Union helps us. But we have now decided – after decades of discussion, I must say – to pass a skilled labor immigration law in Germany. This, on the other hand, also means that we must achieve better management of migration. But we have also made significant progress in this regard in recent years.

We have experienced – and I want to add this as the fourth point – that we will only really make progress if we abandon the belief that we can develop alone. We have seen with the Syrian war and with terrorism in Iraq how globalization comes to us in Europe and especially in Germany, in the form of many refugee movements. Therefore, I am quite proud to say that Germany is one of the major donors in the arc from Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon to stabilize this region. Because we know it is much better if people can stay in their homeland and do not fall into the hands of smugglers. And our development also progresses better when we help on the ground. Therefore, this region will be our focus, but also the partnership with Africa. We have done a lot in this regard during our G20 presidency.

I want to emphasize again: Africa is often seen from a European perspective as a problem continent. If we look at how Africa, a huge continent with two billion inhabitants by 2050, is gradually working together multilaterally, strengthening its African Union, strengthening its regional associations, wanting to introduce freedom of movement, and has a strong, clear vision of future infrastructure projects, then we must also see Africa as a continent of opportunities. This is especially true for us Europeans, who are neighbors to Africa.

Therefore, a clear commitment to multilateralism is, even if it requires courage, an essential prerequisite for our policy. It is also worthwhile to bring like-minded people together in the world, because anything else will lead us into misery. In this sense, Germany sees its future very clearly in the European Union. Because the European Union can generate the strength to move things forward.

However, we now have to live with the shock that the United Kingdom wants to leave the European Union. My entire focus is on achieving this in an orderly manner, in which we can have a good partnership for the benefit of all. We urgently depend on cooperation with the British on issues of internal security, external security, and defense. But we are also a trading area; and the closer and more straightforward our relationships are, the better. But that is, of course, also in the hands of the United Kingdom.

We have always advocated free trade in the European Union. And I am glad that the EU-Japan free trade agreement will come into force on February 1. We are also advocating for trade talks with the United States. We have completed trade talks with Canada. And I believe more should follow – Singapore, Australia, if possible also Mercosur and others.

We have made the tremendous step in Europe to say: We want to pool our defense capabilities in the future as well. This is also a question of self-understanding. This common strategic agreement to think defense policy together is not directed against NATO. It can even facilitate matters for NATO, because today we have over 170 defense systems or weapon systems. The United States has, I believe, under 60. You can imagine what an efficiency loss that is in terms of training, education, and maintenance.

The decision, for example, by Germany and France to build fighter jets together in the future, to build tanks together, is of course a strategically very important decision – just as the signing of the Aachen Treaty between Germany and France yesterday as a continuation of the Élysée Treaty in a time of many uncertainties is a commitment: Yes, we want to be important partners in Europe and further develop the European Union. It was very moving for me yesterday that not only the French president and the German chancellor signed a treaty, but that this also took place in the presence of the president of the commission, the president of the European council, and the rotating council presidency of the Romanian president, to make it very clear: We want to contribute to strengthening Europe.

But we Germans, I want to tell you, still have – historically shaped – our difficulties with multilateralism. Because agreeing on arms export guidelines with France, for example, is a huge piece of work. But it must be done, because no one will develop weapon systems with us if they do not know whether they can sell them later. That means I want to explicitly say here: It is not that multilateralism always comes easily to me, because that would always be simple; rather, it is a difficult matter. But I must always ask myself: What is the alternative; and what does that mean? We see it in all our countries: We have the challenges of populism, we have nationalist forces – and we must stand against them. But perhaps this also clarifies and strengthens the battle order.

Therefore, I will strongly advocate with my colleagues in Germany in the cabinet that our multilateral order does not end with the European Union, but that it becomes one that really provides good answers to new global challenges. However, this requires that we do not ruin the existing order to the extent that no one believes in new guiding principles anymore. Therefore, I am pleased to have clarified this in this sense here.

Thank you very much.