Press conference by Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic, notably on financial regulation and on new international governance, in Seoul (Republic of Korea) on November 12, 2010.

France Nicolas Sarkozy · President of France

12 November 2010 · G20 Summit · Seoul, South Korea

Context
Sarkozy addressed a press conference at the G20 Seoul Summit on November 12, 2010, outlining outcomes and France's upcoming G20 Presidency priorities.
Main themes
Exchange rates and global imbalances, financial regulation, Basel III banking framework, IMF reform and governance, international monetary system reform, French G20 Presidency priorities, commodity price volatility, development finance, shadow banking regulation, moralization of capitalism, tax havens, G20 legitimacy
Duration
~39 min
89th percentile
Words
4,620
89th percentile
Sentences
218
91st percentile
Readability
59
85th percentile
Grade
9.9
19th percentile
Syntax
2.91
36th percentile
Vocabulary
2.06
19th percentile

G7 / G20 Summit Communiqués Translated from French

This is an interview, press conference or exchange with other speakers. It is split into sentences and counted in the corpus, but its sentences are not tagged on the twelve indices.

218 sentences in 81 paragraphs

Ladies and gentlemen, my first words will be for the Korean Presidency, which I would like to thank for its remarkable work over the past six months. This was the first time that an emerging country has presided over the G20, and our Korean friends did so with great professionalism.

Our main topic was the issue of exchange rates and global imbalances, which France was -- I believe I can say -- the first to highlight the importance of. There was great tension before the start of this Summit. All G20 members worked towards calming the situation.

On substance, we agreed to reiterate our rejection of competitive devaluations and the importance of flexible exchange rates that must reflect the fundamentals of the economy.

We also agreed that there cannot be a simplistic solution to address the imbalances in balance of payments, such as a single, quantified target for capping current accounts.

What was important was to agree on the creation of a mechanism to monitor persistent imbalances. The G20 in Seoul entrusted the French Presidency with the task of establishing this mechanism. The first step will be the development of indicators to identify imbalances. This will take place in the first half of 2011. The first assessment of the G20 countries, conducted with the help of the IMF, will therefore occur under the French Presidency, and I thank Christine LAGARDE for all her work and efforts to achieve this first agreement.

Beyond this first topic, the G20 has demonstrated its ability to fulfill its commitments on issues that are dear to us:

- Financial regulation: we agreed on a new prudential framework for banks, better known as "Basel III," which provides for a tripling of the capital requirements imposed on banks. This was not an easy task. It took ten years to negotiate "Basel II," which, by the way, was not even applied by American banks when the crisis broke out. It took us only two years to adopt this first truly global banking regulation agreement.

- The second major advancement, it seems to me, is the reform of the International Monetary Fund, of which France was one of the first advocates. Thanks to the G20's actions over the past two years, the IMF's resources have more than tripled, and its governance has been rebalanced in favor of major emerging economies with a transfer of more than 6% of capital. I remind you that in Pittsburgh, we agreed on a transfer of 5%. The reform of the IMF, following the reform of the World Bank, is the advancement of global governance.

Finally, the Seoul Summit has paved the way for the priorities we have set under our Presidency.

- On the reform of the international monetary system, the G20, for the first time, stated that its goal was to build a more stable and resilient international monetary system and asked the IMF to work on this, entrusting the French Presidency with a mandate to achieve this goal.

- On the volatility of commodity prices, we obtained a mandate for the relevant international organizations in the fields of energy and agriculture to produce expertise and recommendations for decisions under our presidency.

- On governance, while we have just reformed the IMF after the World Bank, we have fully supported the Korean Presidency for several months to include development in the G20 agenda. The G20 has decided that finance ministers will work on the proposals for innovative financing presented by Prime Minister MELES in the report he just submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

We will also continue the priorities that have always been ours: the moralization of capitalism, strict oversight of traders' compensation, and strict oversight of tax havens.

Several G20 members have indeed asked the French Presidency to produce a number of reports on non-cooperative jurisdictions. We have decided to tackle the issues of systemic institutions, as we now have a mandate to regulate the non-bank financial system, the well-known "shadow banking."

A word to conclude on the French Presidency. I will have the opportunity to discuss it in detail at a press conference that I will hold at the Élysée Palace in January. We approach this Presidency with ambition and realism.

What should be the responsibilities of the G20 after the crisis? The G20 in times of crisis has accomplished considerable work; the post-crisis G20 must lay the foundations for the structural reforms that the world needs. If the G20 does not address the structural reforms that the world needs, it will lose its legitimacy. However, the achievement of these past two years is that the G20 has gained significant legitimacy.

We have proposed to our partners to share our great ambitions. These are projects of which I am well aware that they are colossal and cannot be completed in just one year.

We will work with a sense of collectivity, as I will have the opportunity to meet between the end of this year and the beginning of next year with Mr. OBAMA in the United States and Mr. ZUMA, likely in South Africa, the Indian Prime Minister, after all the meetings I have had so far to prepare this presidency well and to try to achieve consensus on absolutely central issues such as the moralization of capitalism, the regulation of the commodity market, and the strong improvement of the international monetary order, which is in great need of it. I add that I had a meeting in session with Dilma ROUSSEF, the new Presidency of Brazil, and another with Mr. LULA, particularly on bilateral issues.

We will conduct this consultation beyond our G20 partners, as it is necessary to gather many countries around the ambitions of the G20. As I did at the Europe-Asia Summit, at the Francophonie Summit in Montreux, I will go to Addis Ababa in January for the African Union Summit.

I can confirm that our Chinese friends have agreed to host in China, in the spring, the first working seminar of the G20 on the reform of the international monetary system, and I am very grateful to President HU for having accepted this.

We will not arrive with fully packaged projects. We will try to reach consensus, but with, of course, great convictions because the world can no longer wait.

It is essential that we lay the foundations for the institutions of the 21st century. A new world is presenting itself before us. We must have new ideas to face this new world, in order to better protect citizens and ensure a more effective and better-regulated capitalism.

So, ladies and gentlemen, I am at your disposal to answer your questions.

QUESTION -- Mr. President, how will the roadmap of the French presidency be organized regarding this work on monetary issues? So there will be a seminar or a meeting in Beijing or China in the first half, but how will you work with the International Monetary Fund to try to eliminate or reduce global imbalances?

THE PRESIDENT -- I will receive Mr. STRAUSS-KAHN in December at the Élysée. A date has already been set. We will work hand in hand with the IMF. There are two possible strategies -- in my view, there is only one, but still -- there are two possible strategies. The first is to blame each other, with surplus countries blaming deficit countries for being in deficit and deficit countries blaming surplus countries for being in surplus. This strategy leads to certain failure, absolutely certain. I add a personal remark: I do not see how we can blame certain countries for acting unilaterally since there is no multilateral system.

What matters is to lay the foundations for an authentically multilateral monetary system. I will not tire of reminding that at Bretton Woods, they worked for a year while at that time there was only one major economy, the United States, and one major currency.

So, I am not saying that in one year of the French presidency we will solve all the problems of the international monetary order of the 21st century. But today, what can we say?

The second solution is, on the contrary, to try through dialogue to bring everyone together to lay the foundations for the system of the 21st century. When France began to talk about a new Bretton Woods, since I believe I mentioned it for the first time at the United Nations two years ago, I remember that we were looked at a bit like strange people: "What are they thinking?"

Today, it is the unanimity of the G20, and indeed of the world, that considers it necessary to reflect on the improvement of our international monetary order. Not even the President of the World Bank, Mr. ZOELLICK, has made a statement -- I do not comment on the substance of what he said, and there is much to say, but it is extremely interesting that an American raises the question, in a statement that made waves, of the necessity of improving the system.

I have also seen the statements of Mr. GREENSPAN; it is extremely interesting to see what he says. He too says: "We need to think about a new system." This is extremely new. The fact that President HU has accepted that a seminar be held in China, with the participation of the Chinese, is also a considerable advancement. No one today disputes that there is a problem, no one.

France will put a paper on the table; we will reflect on it, we will work on it. In this matter, Ms. LARGARDE and I can count on the support of Mr. SCHÄUBLE as well as Ms. MERKEL, whom we closely involve in our work. I have seen with great interest that emerging countries like Brazil are saying: "Stop the fire, we see an influx of capital that is creating speculative bubbles in our country; this needs to change!" So there has been a lot of progress in the past two years, a lot.

It is very complicated, it is very difficult, there will be many challenges to overcome. But the legitimacy of the debate is no longer questioned by anyone. And even better, the G20 gives the French Presidency a mandate to advance on the subject. We are far from the skepticism of just a few months ago.

Now I must say that, in a way, we are served by the crisis, as everyone clearly sees the consequences of this situation. And the confrontation that followed, the difficulty the Korean Presidency had in finding an agreement, which is better than a disagreement, but which does not structurally resolve the problems posed, of course.

Even on the regulation of commodity prices, when France spoke about it, everyone raised their hands to the sky. Today, many people tell us: "Yes, we need to work on this; it is important." And we have a mandate to work on it, so progress is being made.

But I recognize the vastness of the path that remains to be traveled and the very great difficulties. We must first reassure everyone, agree on the questions, and cautiously advance responses. There you go. All for a meeting at the beginning of November 2001 in France in Cannes; I forgot to tell you that.

QUESTION -- Mr. President, you say that, in a way, we are served by the crisis; I would like to have a...

THE PRESIDENT -- It is a way of speaking because I am not pleased about it, of course.

QUESTION -- On Europe, can you comment on the statement that was made? Mr. TRICHET warned on October 29 about the risks of discussing the contribution of the private sector to the bailout of struggling eurozone countries. We saw what that led to, which is a new crisis. So what is your judgment on that?

THE PRESIDENT -- Because for you, Mr. LE PARMENTIER, it is automatic; there is a new crisis because there was this statement?

QUESTION -- No, there is a little ambiguity, if I understood correctly, but that is the question I wanted to ask you.

THE PRESIDENT -- Because if you think that it is solely the agreement that creates the conditions for the crisis, I am ready to withdraw the agreement, and then there is no more crisis.

QUESTION -- No, it is the mention of the contribution of the private sector that raised a doubt.

THE PRESIDENT -- No, but I will come to that, but in your expression, I know you are a precise man, that you work a lot, you say: "We saw what that led to." We have seen nothing at all.

The crisis, Mr. LE PARMENTIER -- you know very well, you who follow this --, the crisis has much deeper, much more structural reasons.

So, first, I had the pleasure of having a long lunch with Mr. TRICHET; it is always a pleasure, I truly say, I have known him for a long time, and we talked for two hours about the situation, what we wanted to do, and the difficulties that could arise in the future.

Regarding this agreement, I had the opportunity to discuss it with Mrs. MERKEL first thing this morning, as soon as I arrived, since I was sure that it was necessary to clarify things, and the finance ministers of five European countries led by Mrs. Christine LAGARDE -- Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain -- why these five? Because we happened to be there -- they have just clarified the interpretation of this agreement, independent of the debate within the eurozone on the future permanent crisis resolution mechanism with the possible participation of the private sector.

It is clear to us that this mechanism will not apply -- words have meaning -- to any existing debt and that this mechanism will not apply to any program under the current instruments.

To be even more precise, any new mechanism would only be effective after mid-2013 and would therefore have no impact on the mechanisms currently in place. In other words, to put it even more simply, we are only targeting debt contracted from mid-2013 onwards. What would have been said if we had not managed to reach an agreement here and someone said: "after 2013, there is no mechanism"? That would have been even more stressful.

So, it is clarified, it is clear, and it should not pose any problem. Therefore, the European Financial Stability Facility is in place, and its activation does not require the involvement of the private sector until the new mechanism is established. And this has been done in full agreement with Mrs. MERKEL. Mrs. LAGARDE is here; she can testify to that; it is naturally in full agreement. And this follows the discussions I had with Mr. TRICHET before leaving. It just so happened that it was fortuitous; we had agreed to talk, and there you go. So it is really clear, straightforward, and precise.

QUESTION -- You mentioned the colossal challenges, your term, that await the French presidency; you indicated that they will not be completed in a year. But by what criteria can we judge the success of the French Presidency, at what level?

THE PRESIDENT -- With your kindness... There is not a sensible person who can imagine that we will have resolved all the questions of the new international monetary system. I take an example: should the yuan participate in the SDR, yes or no? It is very easy to ask the question; the answer is a long process of persuasion. There have been forty-two monetary crises since 1990; should there be a national response, a regional response, as Europe has done, or a universal response? That is a subject. Mr. ZOELLICK proposes to link -- while I found his article remarkable, it is an idea that does not fully satisfy me, since, as you know, there is a huge difference between the amount of money supply, which should be around 61 trillion dollars, well, I don't want to mislead you, and the value of the gold stock, which should be 1.3 trillion dollars -- so if we make guarantees, you can imagine what that might mean for the price of gold. But for Mr. ZOELLICK to propose something is fantastic. It seems to me that it is already a success that the G20 accepts to consider it a problem. You follow these issues; you know well that this was not the case.

On the matter of commodities, the regulation of commodities. The positions are also opposed between Argentina and Brazil, who say: "but not at all, good if it goes up," and the countries where there are food riots, or we, who say: "we cannot go from 40 dollars a barrel of Brent to 140." There is a gap, but we accept to talk about it.

A first progress could be transparency; a second progress, even more important, would be the beginning of regulation on commodity derivatives, as we have done regulation on financial derivatives.

Innovative financing, which is a French priority: we have a mandate, we, the French Presidency, based on the report of MELES Zenawi, to move forward. If we ever manage to get a few countries to agree on a start of innovative financing, that would be a success.

Already that the G20, which is 2 years old, agrees to give a mandate to a presidency to embrace such subjects, already the organization of a seminar on the international monetary system in China was not obvious, to say the least. So after that, everyone can consider that the glass is half full, half empty, completely full, completely empty -- completely full, I would be surprised; moreover, I do not think that technically, to be very honest with you, we have the answers on all these subjects.

The world has always, fundamentally, been dominated by one currency or a very small number of currencies. It seems to me that this is the first time there is a multilateral monetary system, as we are in a politically multilateral world. And how do we make them work? How do we adjust their values according to the fundamentals?

The simple fact that we are asked to work on what the criteria will be in the spring to mark that a country is in excessive surplus or excessive deficit may seem like a small thing, but just that, because you can see what is behind it. If we were to agree on criteria, you can see what that could lead to.

We have the agreement on that. We do not have the agreement on the criteria, but we have the agreement that there will be criteria and that we must define them under the French presidency, preferably before the summer. We have the agreement on that. Already that is very important.

But look, in two years we have reformed the World Bank and the IMF. Six months ago, who among you would have thought we would achieve an IMF reform? Which one? It was the chronicle of a failure. And in any case, if it does not happen at the G20, it will not happen anywhere else.

QUESTION -- There has been a lot of talk about the tension before this summit. I would like to know what you propose, what you can do as the future president of the G20 to calm this tension?

THE PRESIDENT -- Your question is a bit discouraging because I thought I had explained it somewhat. What we can do is get to the heart of the problems technically and politically, to try to clear up misunderstandings and bring positions together. That is why -- and I thank Mrs. LAGARDE who replaced me yesterday, since I had to attend the commemorative ceremonies of November 11 in Paris -- we have made sure to push for consensus and not to take sides. It is also the work of the presidency; the presidency must be able to speak with everyone, Americans as well as Chinese, Germans as well as Brazilians, and that is what we have tried to do.

QUESTION -- To what extent will the important issues you have described for the French Presidency of the G20 find their expression or extension in the architecture of a government that you seem to be preparing to reshuffle in the coming days?

THE PRESIDENT -- I congratulate you. I saw the head of the snake; I could not see the end of the snake, but I have seen it. I am here in Seoul; I will have a bilateral exchange with the South Korean president; please forgive me, but I will not answer strictly French questions?

But one of the challenges, of course, for all of us is to make our fellow citizens in all our countries understand that what is being discussed here has consequences for people's daily lives. It is not easy, I readily admit, first because it is extremely technical, secondly because people say: "it is very distant; how will this change my daily life?" And at the same time, our fellow citizens must understand that when there is a crisis like the one we experienced in 2008, we must draw the consequences and regulate. It is a very important challenge, and it is not won.

QUESTION -- You just met with Mrs. ROUSSEF and Mr. LULA; did they communicate a decision to you regarding the possible purchase of Rafale by Brazil?

THE PRESIDENT -- We talked about it. I remain confident, but the decision belongs to our Brazilian friends, and if they want to communicate about it, they will certainly do so when they have decided. It is not for me to announce their decision. Well, it is also a long process, as you know. And we also talked about the bridge over the Oyapock, which is progressing.

QUESTION -- I have a question regarding institutions too big to fail. Has the G20 considered the idea of publishing a list of these institutions, as has been mentioned in the press? And a small appendix regarding my country; we are talking about very large banks, there are some in Switzerland; we are talking about important currencies, the Swiss franc is one; would it be conceivable that next year Switzerland be invited to the G20 summit?

THE PRESIDENT -- So regarding the list, I tell you as clearly as possible, there has never been the idea of publishing a list, never. I must say that personally, I am very reserved about saying that only large banks are dangerous. Experience shows that problems can arise from smaller banks, as seen in Germany and Spain. It would be an error, it seems to me, of analysis -- and I share this view with Mrs. LAGARDE very clearly -- to simply target large banks.

Regarding Switzerland, you are right; Switzerland matters in monetary matters, and one of the ideas of the French Presidency is that, within the framework of the preparatory seminars, countries that have something to say in monetary matters be invited, without necessarily being members of the G20. So it is perfectly clear -- I had said this to the President of the Confederation -- that it would be appropriate to invite Switzerland in the context of the preparatory seminars for the G20.

After that, the G20 has a number of rules that follow very specific prescriptions; I cannot make commitments. But it is very relevant for Switzerland to be invited to participate in the work of seminars on these issues, absolutely. It is even very important.

QUESTION -- Mr. President, perhaps to be even clearer, compared to the Presidency of the European Union, how would you compare the role you intend to play during this G20 Presidency? It seems that you see yourself more as a midwife of consensus between America, China, and other giants. Is that it?

THE PRESIDENT -- Midwife? I do not have an absolutely obvious vocation as an obstetrician, but yes, it is not us who can dictate to China, Mrs. HADJAJE, or to the United States or to so many others... But on the other hand, we proposed the agenda; it is accepted, and then we will make proposals, we will move forward.

The Presidency of the European Union is very complicated, and it lasted six months. If you want me to say that in the scale of difficulties, the G20 is even more difficult, yes, that is undeniable. It is undeniable because the European Union has 27 countries. The G20 has 20, actually more with the institutions; but above all, the differences in cultures, the differences in ties, the differences in histories, the differences in interests are exponentially different compared to what exists within Europe. Yes, that is certain.

Let’s say that within Europe, we have two criteria: the Southern countries and the Northern countries; and then let’s say, the small countries and the larger countries to put it roughly... We have these two frameworks of analysis. In the G20, it is really what we call multiple entries; it is not just these criteria; there are many others: there are Asian solidarities, African solidarities, solidarities of emerging countries, solidarities of the East, solidarities of developed countries, between the poorest countries and emerging countries... well, it is countless, of course, but at the same time, it is fascinating.

And since France has the honor of assuming the Presidency of the G20, let’s seize this opportunity fully and try to have great ambitions. But for that, we must talk to everyone, not block. Our whole idea is not to block on solutions presented on the table too quickly. To gather around a shared observation and, in a second step, make proposals.

Because once everyone is engaged in the discussion, it is difficult to get out of it without doing anything in the end.

A question for our Korean friends.

QUESTION -- Thank you, Mr. President. I would like to ask you a question about the return of royal documents that were sent to France and are currently kept at the BNF. So I believe you will meet President LEE Myung-bak to discuss this issue. And what will be the consensus or agreement on the subject?

THE PRESIDENT -- Yes. It is not I believe; it is I will meet President LEE; of course, I will meet him. And this question will find its resolution, as I fully intend to honor the promise made by President François MITTERRAND during the first visit of a French president to Korea in 1993. These documents are documents that really pertain to Korean identity, which are -- I hope you will not hold it against me -- but to be royal, they are political documents and thus were a deep irritant between this great country that is South Korea and France.

Commitments have been made, and the word that has been given must be kept. So we already have an agreement with our Korean friends based on a loan for five years, renewable every five years on these documents. I want to clarify that this does not apply to other objects or works of art that may belong to the universal heritage, regardless of where they are located, but I know that for Korea, this has an extremely particular sensitivity and that it is highly anticipated, so the time has come to address this issue. The loan for five years, renewable every five, allows us to satisfy our Korean friends without setting a precedent for France or for other countries. Therefore, I believe this is very good news, which will be received as such in Korea.

Thank you very much. Thank you all.